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For more than 2 centuries, economists have been interested in agricultural con-
tracts, especially landowner-tenant contracts. The early work by Marshall (1890)
argued that share tenancy was inefficient relative to owner cultivation and should
not be expected to persist when other arrangements are available. Later D. Gale
Johnson (1950) and Cheung (1969) argued that, if landowners can costlessly
monitor and enforce tenants’ effort, then share tenancy can compete effectively
with owner cultivation or cash rental. Subsequently, Stiglitz (1974) and New-
berry and Stiglitz (1979) introduced principal-agent models in the more realistic
case where monitoring is costly to study optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing
given the need to study adequate tenant incentives. More recently, Prendergast
(2002) suggested that the negative trade-off between effort incentives and risk
is tenuous or wrong in principal-agent contracting, including share tenancy in
agriculture. Allen and Lueck (2002) have also argued against risk sharing as a
motive for share tenancy in developed countries because of the presence of
well-developed instruments for risk sharing that are available regardless of
tenancy arrangements. Based on transactions costs, they predict that cash rental
is more likely than share rental when farmland value is low.
These results, however, are at odds with the stylized facts that emerge
from the empirical land-tenancy literature. For example, Ackerberg and Bot-
ticini (2002) have recently provided new empirical evidence that tenants’ risk
aversion affects land tenancy contract choice. Furthermore, a host of studies
verify that share tenancy is widespread in agriculture, especially in countries
at lower levels and earlier stages of economic development (Stiglitz 1974;
Quibra and Rashid 1984; Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992; Laffont and
Matoussi 1995; Lanjouw 1999; Ackerberg and Botticini 2002; Allen and
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Lueck 2002; Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak 2002; Duffy et al. 2003). In fact,
share contracts dominate tenancy arrangements in low-income areas, partic-
ularly in Asia, while fixed cash rental leasing dominates in Europe and North
America (Otsuka et al. 1992; Anderson and Magleby 1997). Specifically,
Banerjee et al. (2002) show that for 1969–76 (i.e., before special land reforms
fixed the landowner’s share at an artificially low rate of 25%), 90% of tenancy
land in West Bengal, India, was leased with a standard contract of 50 : 50
landowner-tenant crop shares. Lanjouw (1999) reports that for Palanpur, a
village in Uttah Pradesh, India, 80% of leases had standard 50 : 50 crop-share
contracts in 1983.1
In contrast, cash rental contracting has grown in popularity over time in
developed agriculture, especially in the United States. In 1988 and 1992, 65%
of rented U.S. farmland was for cash and 30% was for shares (Anderson
1994; Anderson and Magleby 1997).2 For the Corn Belt, Lake States, and
Northern Plains in 1988, 55% of farm leases were for cash. In the other
regions of the country, cash rental leases were even more common, ranging
up to 85% by region. In the Salinas Valley of California in 2003, an area
where the land is fertile, irrigated, and used to produce multiple-cropped
vegetables, roughly 90% of the land was rented for cash in 2003. This land
is extremely highly valued, and, accordingly, the typical cash rental rate was
far higher ($2,500 per acre) than cash rents in the Midwest. In Iowa, 73% of
the leased farmland was for cash rent in 2003, although the choice between
cash and share terms varied widely by local circumstances. For southwest
Iowa, where rainfall is more variable and farmland is rolling and subject to
severe erosion, 60% of the leased farmland was for a crop share in 2003, but
in east central Iowa, where rainfall is less variable and the farmland is less
subject to erosion, 83% of leased farmland was for cash.3 Moreover, 94% of
the crop-share leases in Iowa were for 50 : 50 sharing (Duffy et al. 2003).4
The empirical literature has also noted that share contracts tend to be oral and
informal (Allen and Lueck 2002). Of the 24% that were rented for a crop
share in 2003, only 44% had a written lease, while 62% of cash leases (where
the landowner has less control) had written leases (Duffy et al. 2003).
We begin by stressing these key stylized facts that emerge from the
empirical land tenancy literature. Our purpose is to construct a coherent model
that explains why a limited range of contracts are in use and their regional
variation by circumstances. The stylized facts we suggest should be explained
by a comprehensive tenure contract model:
1. Production is sufficiently stochastic that agents’ efforts are impractically
costly to monitor.
2. Contracts on effort are unenforceable by a third party; thus, perfor-
mance must be voluntary.
3. Crop-share contracts are renewable and tend to be informal oral
contracts.
4. Crop-share contracts persist in agriculture for countries at diverse stages
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of development.
5. Crop-share (cash) rent tends to dominate in developing (developed)
agriculture.
6. Where crop-share tenancy is observed, the most common contract is
50 : 50 sharing.
Although recent theoretical literature on optimal tenancy contracting has ac-
commodated a few of these stylized facts, such as points 1–3 (see Allen and
Lueck 1999; Young and Burke 2001), a conceptual model has not been pre-
sented that comprehensively admits this complete set of stylized facts and yet
explains why contracts tend to be limited to these two specific types. The
studies that have attempted to explain the choice of cash versus share contracts
have admitted only these two possible choices (Ackerberg and Botticini 2002)
rather than explaining why only these two alternatives emerge empirically.
Other studies have focused on conformity to local practices but have not
offered a comprehensive explanation for observed similarities and differences
in contracts across disconnected regions (Young and Burke 2001).
To accomplish this purpose, we employ modern agency theory to model
contracting between principals (landowners) and agents (tenants). Although
we develop a static model, we rely on results elsewhere that demonstrate the
implications and clear advantages of repetition for renewable problems with
hidden actions (moral hazard), unobservable and thus noncontractible effort
(potential adverse selection), and the infeasibility of third-party enforcement.5
For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 259–63) analyze the role of
reputation in models of contract enforcement and reach the standard conclusion
that contracts must be incentive compatible and meet voluntary participation
constraints so that both parties to a contract have incentives to fulfill it. In
this framework, the principal and agent know when the terms of a contract
are met even though they cannot be verified formally by a third party such
as a court (Holmstrom 1989; MacLeod 2003; Serfes 2003). A Nash equilib-
rium is reached when neither party can gain from making a unilateral deviation
from the prescribed or expected behavior.
In the most general versions of the standard agency model, for example,
Grossman and Hart (1983), Kim (1995), or Bolton and Harris (2001), simple
agency contracts for an applied analysis of the trade-off between effort in-
centives and risk sharing are difficult to generate. Alternatively, we apply the
more common and now classic model offered by Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) and Holmstrom (1989).6 Their model considers linear incentives, which
are robust to gaming strategies, as well as the implications of contract re-
newability.7 This model generates optimal contracts consisting of two parts:
a fixed “guarantee” payment plus an incentive rate that is a share of the
principal’s payoff. These contracts have two attractive features: (i) optimal
contracts are linear in measured payoff and (ii) the strength of incentive for
effort is decreasing in payoff risk. With renewable contracts, both principals
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and agents have an incentive to follow through because neither wants to bear
the social cost of a damaged reputation, which affects future ability to contract.
Our model is, however, somewhat more general than the models offered
by Holmstrom (1989), Allen and Lueck (1999), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002),
or Serfes (2003). While they consider the heterogeneity of risk preferences
among agents and riskiness of tasks contracted by principals, we also permit
agents to be heterogeneous in productivity of effort, cost of effort, and reser-
vation utility. Differences in productivity of effort may be related to human
capital in the form of general education and experience (Huffman 1974, 2001)
or experience with the landowner’s particular land.8 Principals (landowners) are
also potentially risk averse and heterogeneous in risk preferences.9 Our results
show how each of these forms of heterogeneity on the part of both agents and
landowners matters for optimally designed land tenure contracts.10 We also show
why share tenancy is a robust contract in a variety of economic environments,
why share contracts tend to dominate in developing countries whereas cash
rental contracts tend to dominate in developed countries, and why the standard
share contract is likely to specify 50 : 50 landowner-tenant crop shares.
First, we selectively review the tenancy literature and provide a more
detailed critique and justification of the assertions above. Second, we develop
and apply a principal-agent model of tenancy arrangements. Third, we apply
and generalize the principal-agent model to a theoretical and conceptual anal-
ysis of land tenancy to show how stylized facts can be explained. In the final
section, we present conclusions.
A Selective Review of the Tenancy Literature
Much of the land tenancy literature has considered why landowners rent land
for fixed amounts (whether stated in cash or units of the crop) versus a fixed
share of the crop. A parallel question of why farm operators hire labor at a
fixed hourly rate of pay versus a fixed piece rate has often been considered in
tandem because the conceptual issues are similar (Alston and Higgs 1982;
Eswaran and Kotwal 1985; Laffont and Matoussi 1995). Share tenancy has
been the dominant land tenure arrangement considered by development econ-
omists because sharecropping has tended to dominate land rental contracting in
developing agriculture (Stiglitz 1974; Newberry and Stiglitz 1979; Otsuka et
al. 1992; Lanjouw 1999; Ackerberg and Botticini 2002; Roumasset and Lee
2003).
Much of the comparison of cash versus share tenancy arrangements fo-
cuses on efficiency implications for the organization of agriculture. Marshall
(1890) argued that share tenancy causes inefficient resource allocation because
the tenant receives only a fraction of his marginal product as marginal revenue,
which weakens the effort incentive. The resulting underemployment of effort
was viewed as causing a relative overuse of land. D. Gale Johnson (1950)
argued that this classical view of crop-share contracts focused too much on
excessive depletion of soil nutrients or soil degradation and not enough on
the role of the amount of land rented. He showed that, if monitoring an agent’s
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work effort is costless and the tenant’s share is a linear function of the tenant’s
labor per unit of land, then the landowner can increase the land rent share
and cause the tenant to reduce the amount of land rented. In his view, this
could mitigate the overemployment of land.
Cheung (1969) later argued that if the tenant’s work effort can be costlessly
observed and enforced by the landowner, resource allocation under share tenancy
can be as efficient as with an owner-operator or with fixed (cash rent) leasing.
He argued, however, that share tenancy and cash rent cannot coexist in a world
with transactions costs and risk-averse tenants but, rather, that share tenancy
would be chosen when the gain from risk sharing is greater than the loss from
transaction costs compared with cash rental. Furthermore, he argued that share
tenancy per se does not cause inefficiency. Rather, institutional restrictions on
share tenancy, for example, on the sharing rate, make it inefficient—at least in
China.11 However, monitoring is typically not costless. Monitoring costs can
be high in crop production because of randomness in weather, soil conditions,
and other aspects of biological production, which thus prevent backing effort
out of observed productivity.
Stiglitz (1974) and Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) presented two of the first
studies to apply principal-agent models to agricultural contracts. Assuming pro-
duction is stochastic and the tenant’s effort is costly to monitor, they consider
the landowner as the principal who offers a rental contract to the tenant as an
agent. With stochastic production, the tenant’s effort cannot be monitored be-
cause it cannot be backed out of the resulting output, which makes it noncon-
tractible. Their results show that a crop-share contract can be rationalized as an
instrument to attain optimal sharing of payoff risk between the landowner and
tenant while providing an adequate incentive for the agent’s effort. Key as-
sumptions in their model are that the agent is risk averse and the principal is
risk neutral and that the principal offers only contracts that jointly maximize
the principal’s and tenant’s welfare. This process eliminates bargaining cost,
which is a potentially important transaction cost in contracting. Using land tenure
arrangements for risk sharing is argued to be important in poor countries where
insurance and credit are hard to obtain. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) have
further extended this work to the theory of the second best to argue that land-
owners should intervene in all imperfectly functioning markets in which tenants
are active, for example, credit, insurance, and input markets.
In related empirical work, Laffont and Matoussi (1995) consider the
choice of share tenancy versus cash rent versus fixed-wage labor in Tunisia—
assuming family labor is unobservable. They explain the predominance of
share tenancy compared with cash rent by emphasizing the importance of
repetitive contracting, the costs of collecting fixed rental payments under moral
hazard (default), and imperfections in input markets such as credit, bullock
power, and technical know-how.
In contrast to the above celebrated works, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993,
1998, 1999, 2002) and Prendergast (2002) have argued against the risk-sharing
motive for contracts. Allen and Lueck argue that commodity, capital, and
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insurance markets are well developed in the United States, that is, all relevant
contingency markets are present and better suited than land tenure contracts
for transferring risk associated with production and marketing. Accordingly,
they argue that risk sharing is unlikely to be a major motivation for landowner-
tenant contracting in modern North American agriculture and instead assume
that both landowners and tenants are risk neutral.12 Alternatively, they argue
that contracts and other patterns of ownership are chosen to mitigate trans-
actions costs—a Coase-type argument.13 They argue that “Mother Nature,” or
heterogeneous local geo-climatic conditions, which largely determine cropping
patterns, are fundamental forces that shape the incentives and transactions
costs that ultimately determine optimal agricultural organization. By choosing
contracts to maximize joint landowner-tenant surplus net of transactions costs,
they predict that cash rental is more likely than share rental when farmland
value is low because overuse of land by the tenant, for example, excess nutrient
or water use, is of less concern to the owner then when farmland value is
high.
For North American agriculture, Allen and Lueck further argue that
relationship-specific assets (specialized land, skilled labor, buildings, and
equipment) are unusual and that reputation effects in rural communities are
real because communities are relatively small and stable. Thus, they explain
the tendency toward oral or simple written contracts versus formal contracts
as a “common law” that has developed in small and stable social environments.
Thus, social customs in contracting become a type of social capital. On this
basis, Allen and Lueck predict that optimal tenant shares will be higher when
inputs are not shared between the landowner and tenant than when inputs are
shared, and that, as the costs of land attributes increase or as land exploitation
becomes more costly, the chosen contract will more likely represent a sharing
of both inputs and output than output sharing alone or cash rental alone. These
arguments are similar to those concerned with asset value when control is
transferred via a contractual relationship. Using samples of individual land
contracts, they find considerable support for these implications of their contract
theory, although presumably similar implications would apply if these features
were added to a model with risk aversion as well. Incidentally, they also report
that sharing rates in North America for field crops are largely 50 : 50 when
the landowner bears some share of the variable costs, although shares are
often 60 : 40 or 67 : 33 when the landowner does not share in variable costs
(Allen and Lueck 2002, pp. 77–84).
Otsuka et al. (1992) and Hayami and Otsuka (1993) have undertaken
major reviews and syntheses of the land-tenancy and labor-contracting liter-
ature with emphasis on Asia using primarily a principal-agent framework
under verifiable contracts. However, they assume contracts are renewable and
verifiable by a third party where all workers and prospective tenants are
homogeneous, implying that all workers and tenants have the same ability
and that technology and all land is homogeneous. In this environment, they
show that reputation effects provide a sufficient incentive to follow through
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(not renege) on contracts and thus maintain the efficiency of crop-share con-
tracts. They also report that “a major puzzle unexplained by existing contract
theories is the stylized fact of share tenancy that output is almost universally
shared between the tenant and landowner at a 50 : 50 ratio with no explicit
fixed payments, despite obvious differences in the relative contributions of
land and labor to agricultural production among different production envi-
ronments and technologies” (Otsuka et al. 1992, p. 1969).
As this brief literature review reveals, the typical tenancy literature has a
variety of shortcomings. Most studies either (1) are based on unjustified as-
sumptions of costless monitoring and enforceability, (2) depend on risk neutrality
(or, equivalently, availability of perfect contingency markets), (3) fail to explain
why share tenancy is prevalent in a wide range of economic environments,
(4) cannot explain the dominance of share tenancy in some circumstances
while cash rent dominates in others, (5) fail to provide an economic expla-
nation for why informal oral contracts persist even in developed countries,
and/or (6) fail to explain why a single sharing rate is common across diverse
agricultural environments.
A Principal-Agent Model of Land Tenancy Arrangements
Agency theory had its humble beginnings in studies of agricultural and in-
surance contracting, focusing on the trade-off between incentives for effort
and risk bearing (see, e.g., Holmstrom 1979; Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green
1995). But agency theory has advanced considerably over the past 2 decades.
In the new agency theory, a principal is assumed to contract with an agent
to undertake some effort where production is stochastic and the agent’s effort
is unobservable. In other words, while the outcome or payoff is observable
to both the principal and agent, effort cannot be verified by a third party such
as a court. Hence, contracts are necessarily informal (Holmstrom 1989; Dixit
2002) and, thus, may be oral.14 Such contracts must be incentive compatible
and meet voluntary participation constraints so that both an economically
rational principal and agent are better off fulfilling their part of the contract
than defaulting. When the principal has full information on agent character-
istics, only contracts that agents will accept are offered in order to eliminate
transactions costs associated with bargaining.
In this section, we develop such a model of land tenancy in agriculture
in which the need for enforceability is avoided by considering implicit con-
tracts between principals and agents that are incentive compatible and meet
voluntary participation constraints. Because agricultural tenancy contracts are
for fixed and typically renewable terms, such as a crop year, protection of
reputation through contract fulfillment is important in retaining the ability to
rent land in future periods.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that, for long-term renewable
contracting between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, a linear
incentive scheme, with a nonnegative guarantee and a nonnegative bonus rate
based on the principal’s outcome, is robust to small aberrations in the environ-
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ment and gaming by agents. In one extreme, the bonus rate is zero, in which
case the principal fully insures the agent (the agent receives a fixed payment
per unit time). But this is a weak incentive for effort and open to shirking,
unless monitoring is feasible. At the other extreme, a bonus rate of one gives
the agent full title to the marginal output, although, without a guarantee, it offers
the agent no insurance against payoff risk. Between these two extremes, a higher
bonus rate creates stronger incentives for the agent to exert effort but also
imposes more risk on the agent, who is relatively disadvantaged by bearing it.
For most problems, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom’s (1989)
model generates both a positive optimal guarantee and a positive bonus rate.
To develop such a model for land tenancy, suppose that the principal is
an agricultural landowner and the agents are tenant farmers. The technology
describing the ith agent’s production, measured by output or net revenue on
one unit of land, is assumed to be linear in effort, ability, and applicable
stochastic shocks,
y (e )p a e    d, ip 1, ... , n, (1)i i i i i
where yi is the output of the ith agent’s production process, ei is the ith agent’s
effort, ai is a positive index of the ith agent’s ability or productivity (see
Huffman and Just 2000), i is a zero-mean agent-specific random shock to
the production process with variance ji2, and d is a zero-mean shock with
variance jd2 that is common across all agents contracting with a given land-
owner, for example, because of variability of production associated with the
interaction of climate, soils, and pest infestations on the landowner’s land.15
For simplicity, all shocks are assumed mutually uncorrelated, although more
general assumptions could be easily accommodated with notational expense.
The total number of agents is n, but an important special case is where
so that each principal contracts with one agent.np 1
Each agent has constant returns to scale and knows the effect of personal
effort ei on expected output, , and the variance of output,E[y (e )]/ e p ai i i i
. The variance of each agent’s output has two com-2 2 2V[y (e )]p q p j  ji i i i d
ponents: the first due to agent-specific randomness (i) and the second due
jointly to principal-specific randomness and other factors common among
agents (d).
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Holmstrom (1989), Dixit
(2002), and Prendergast (2002), suppose that the principal adopts a linear
incentive scheme for rewarding agents,
w p a  b y , (2)i i i i
where ai is an agent-specific “guarantee,” which is unrelated to the agent’s
effort, ability, or output; and is the agent-specific incentiveb (0 X b X 1)i i
rate representing a share of output. If ai is zero, then the agent’s effort is
rewarded purely by a share of the output, as in a crop-share contract where
bi represents the share. If and ai is negative, then the agent makes ab p 1i
fixed payment to the principal and retains all output as with cash rent. But a
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jointly infinite continuum of other combinations of ai and bi can also be
offered by the principal. For example, if bi is zero and ai is positive, the agent
would be a fixed-compensation employee of the principal.
Given equations (1) and (2), the agent’s compensation as a function of
effort is Randomness in output results fromw (e )p a  b a e  b   b d.i i i i i i i i i
i and d and is transmitted to the agent’s compensation if . If the incentiveb 1 0i
rate is zero ( ), then so that the agent’s compensation rep-b p 0 w (e )p ai i i i
resents a pure and certain guarantee. More generally, the agent’s expected com-
pensation is which consists of a guarantee (ai) plus aE[w (e )]p a  b a e ,i i i i i i
share (bi) of the expected output (aiei). Both the agent’s ability-productivity and
effort are key determinants of the agent’s expected incentive. The variance of
the agent’s compensation is which is pro-2 2 2 2 2V[w (e )]p b q p b (j  j ),i i i i i i d
portional to the square of the incentive rate (bi2) and to the variance of output
(qi2), where qi2 is agent-specific (qi2) plus principal-specific and other (jd2)
variability.
A risk-averse agent is assumed to receive utility from compensation for
effort but to require compensation for bearing output risk. Assuming a smooth
second-order differentiable utility function with standard properties, a second-
order Taylor series expansion of utility around expected wealth yields a linear
mean-variance approximation of expected utility (Just and Zilberman 1983).
In addition, each agent is assumed to incur a certain utility loss in providing
effort, for example, in terms of forgone leisure. Assuming that this loss is
purely quadratic in ei for simplicity, the ith agent’s expected utility is rep-
resented by
2 2 2E[U (e )]p a  b a e  0.5F b q  0.5k e , (3)i i i i i i i i i i i
where ki is an agent-specific cost parameter and Fi is the local agent-specific
absolute risk aversion coefficient ( ).16 The first two terms in equationF x 0i
(3) represent the agent’s expected compensation for effort, the third term
reflects the cost of effort, and the fourth term is the component of compensation
required by the agent for risk bearing.
Where the agent is offered a given contract represented by (ai, bi), the
optimal effort chosen by the agent is found by maximizing equation (3) with
respect to ei. The associated first-order condition implies that
∗e p b a /k . (4)i i i i
Hence, each agent’s optimal effort is proportional to the agent’s ability-
productivity (ai) and incentive rate (bi) but inversely proportional to the cost
of effort (ki). Substituting the optimal effort in equation (4) into equation (3)
yields the agent’s optimal expected utility associated with a given contract,
∗ 2E[U (e )]p a  0.5b (p  r ), (5)i i i i i i
where is an agent-specific productivity index and is an2 2p p a /k r p F qi i i i i i
agent-specific reflection of the agent’s risk premium associated with a given
principal.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:59:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
626 Economic Development and Cultural Change
Where a principal has sufficient land to rent to n agents, the principal’s
profit after compensating agents is n nPp  [y (e ) w (e )]p  [(1i i i iip1 ip1
which is positively related to the each agent’s ability-b )(a e    d) a ],i i i i i
productivity (ai) and effort (ei) but negatively related to each agent’s guarantee
(ai). On considering agents’ optimal effort choices in equation (4), the prin-
cipal’s expected profit is
n n
∗E(P)p [(1 b )a e  a ]p [(1 b )b p  a ], (6) i i i i i i i iip1 ip1
and the principal’s variance of profit is
n n2
2 2 2V(P)p j (1 b )  (1 b ) j[ ] d i i ijp1 ip1
n n2
2 2 2p j n b  (1 b ) j . (7)(  ) d i i ijp1 ip1
With incentive compatibility, the principal is assumed to choose agents’
guarantees (ai) and sharing rates (bi), that is, the contracts represented by (ai,
bi), so as to maximize his expected profit subject to agents choosing effort
to maximize their individual expected utilities. With the voluntary participation
condition, the expected compensation offered by the principal to an agent is
at least as large as the agent’s reservation utility. Hence, the negotiating
procedure is such that the principal offers a particular contract (ai, bi) to agent
i, and then the agent decides whether to accept or reject the contract. The
agent accepts the contract if his certainty-equivalent utility under the contract
is at least as large as his reservation utility (mi).17 Although an agent’s res-
ervation utility could be zero, it generally will be positive if the agent has
productive alternative work opportunities.
We assume that the principal is also possibly risk averse with a linear
mean-variance expected utility function approximated about the principal’s
expected wealth with local absolute risk aversion parameter . Hence,F x 00
using equations (6) and (7), the principal’s certainty equivalent expected utility
considering agents’ optimal effort choices is
n
E[U(F)]p [(1 b )b p  a ] i i i iip1
n n2
2 2 2 0.5F n b j  (1 b ) j . (8)[(  )  ]0 j d i ijp1 ip1
The principal maximizes this expected utility with respect to all ai’s and bi’s
subject to each agent’s reservation utility (or voluntary participation) con-
straint. Using the expression in equation (5), the constraints can be represented
as
∗ 2E[U (e )]p a  0.5b (p  r ) x m , ip 1, ... , n. (9)i i i i i i i
Because the principal’s expected utility is decreasing in each ai, the
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principal’s optimal choices for the ai’s will be where the associated reservation
utility constraints are binding (see Huffman and Just 2000). Solving equation
(9) with strict equality, the guarantee component of each contract thus satisfies
2a p m  0.5b (p  r ). (10)i i i i i
The guarantee is thus positively related to the agent’s reservation utility (mi)
and risk premium (ri) but inversely related to the agent’s productivity index
(pi). In other words, agents with greater ability-productivity require a smaller
guarantee to contract with a given principal.
Substituting equation (10) into equation (8) and maximizing with respect
to remaining contract parameters obtains first-order conditions
nE[U(P)]
2p p  b (p  r ) F n b j(  )i i i i 0 j djp1bi
2 F (1 b )j p 0, ip 1, ... , n. (11)0 i i
While these conditions can easily be expressed in matrix form and solved for
an optimal vector of b’s, the qualitative implications are best understood
through some special cases. First, if only one agent contracts with a given
principal as in the typical developed agricultural setting, then equation (11)
reduces to a single equation that implies
2 2p  F (j  j )i 0 i d∗b p , ip 1, ... , n. (12)i 2 2p  r  F (j  j )i i 0 i d
Second, if all n agents are identical ( , , , ,p p p r p r b p b m p m j pi j i j i j i j i
, for all i, j), then equation (11) amounts to n identical equations that implyjj
2 2 2p  F (j  n j )i 0 i d∗b p , ip 1, ... , n. (13)i 2 2 2p  r  F (j  n j )i i 0 i d
Third, whether or not all agents are identical, if the common stochastic term
among agents contracting with a given principal is unimportant , then2j p 0d
equation (11) can be solved equation by equation to obtain
2p  F ji 0 i∗b p , ip 1, ... , n. (14)i 2p  r  F ji i 0 i
In each of equations (12)–(14), the optimal share represents a trade-off
between the principal’s and agent’s risk aversions. The optimal share declines
to zero as the agent’s risk aversion increases without bound (i.e., ), whiler r i
the optimal share increases toward one as the principal’s risk aversion increases
without bound (i.e., ) . Conversely and more interestingly, the optimalF r o
share increases toward one as the agent’s risk aversion declines toward zero,
and the optimal share for a risk-averse agent decreases as the principal’s risk
aversion declines toward zero.
In the limit where the agent is risk neutral 2 2(r p F q p 0# q pi i i i
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each of equations (12)–(14) give the full share of output to the agent0),
( ) and no share to the principal.18 In this case, equation (10) yieldsb p 1i
so that substitution of equation (10) into equation (8) implies∗a p m  0.5p ,i i i
n
E[U(P)]p (m  0.5p ). i iip1
In other words, if the agent gets the full share of output, then the only benefit
to the principal is a fixed payment made by the agent to the principal, which
is positive and advantageous to the principal when , that is, whena ! 0i
. This result clearly justifies a scenario in which optimal farmland0.5p 1 mi i
rental contracts are fixed cash rental leases.19
By contrast, in the limit where the agent is risk averse and the principal
is risk neutral ( ), the optimal share in each of the cases in equationsF p 00
(12)–(14) becomes
pi∗b p , (15)i p  ri i
such that This optimal share is increasing in agent-specific pro-∗0 X b X 1.i
ductivity , assuming positive productivity and agent risk aversion∗(b /p 1 0)i i
( , ), and is thus higher for risk-averse agents with greater ability-p 1 0 r 1 0i i
productivity. However, the optimal share from a given principal declines with
the risk premium , as one would expect when the principal can∗(b /p ! 0)i i
carry risk more efficiently.
Substituting equation (15) into equation (10) obtains the agent’s optimal
guarantee component that will be offered by a given principal,
2p (p  r )i i i∗a p m  0.5 . (16)i i 2(p  r )i i
If this is a positive payment from the agent to the principal ( ) then in∗a ! 0i
effect the agent partially compensates the principal for insurance against output
risk. The optimal guarantee ( ) is positively related to the agent’s reservation∗a i
utility (mi). If the agent’s productivity discounted by the risk premium is
positive ( ), then the agent’s optimal guarantee is inversely relatedp  r 1 0i i
to the agent’s productivity and positively related to the agent’s∗(a / p ! 0)i i
risk premium If , then the opposite is true, but this is an∗(a /r 1 0). p ! ri i i i
implausible case where raising the share makes the agent worse off because
of excessive risk aversion. If , then the optimal guarantee is unrelatedp p ri i
to the agent’s productivity index (pi) and risk premium (ri).
An Agency Theory Explanation of Stylized Facts regarding
Land Tenancy
In this section, we show that stylized facts describing agricultural land tenancy
are consistent with the land tenancy model of this article. First, consistent
with predominant reality, landowner-tenant contracts are assumed renewable
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on satisfactory renegotiation, which makes the reputational effects of contract
performance important. Second, the model considers the reality of stochastic
production and accordingly does not impose unrealistic assumptions of cost-
less monitoring or enforceability. Rather, contracts are based only on behavior
that can be expected without monitoring or enforcement.
Third, because contracts are limited to cases that satisfy incentive com-
patibility, and voluntary participation constraints, formal contracting is not
necessary. Contracts that are mutually preferred under repetition are fulfilled.
Assuming formal contracting incurs transaction costs, informal oral contract-
ing is thus preferred.20 Hence, the model provides a rationale for the persistence
of informal land rental contracts in both developing and developed countries.
Finally, consider the consistency of contract choices implied by the model
with the remaining stylized facts outlined at the beginning of this article.
Because the model considers a wide variety of circumstances describing land-
owners and tenants, the implications can be compared with observed reality
across the variety of conditions that exist in agriculture.
In some cases, this consideration requires investigation of market equi-
librium conditions. In the model of Stiglitz (1974) and Holmstrom (1989),
all principals are homogeneous and all agents are homogeneous. Thus, equi-
librium can be investigated trivially based on optimal incentive contracting
between a representative principal and a representative agent. Alternatively,
following Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Serfes (2003), we assume that
both principals and agents are heterogeneous. However, both of these studies
model heterogeneity empirically assuming that all heterogeneity of agents
results from risk preferences and all heterogeneity of principals results from
the riskiness of the task that is contracted. Furthermore, Ackerberg and Bot-
ticini (2002) consider only the two typical contracts (cash vs. share rental) as
alternative choices, assuming that all principals and agents are captive players
with no alternatives. Serfes, however, considers a continuum of contracts.
In contrast, we consider a variety of forms of heterogeneity and the full
range of contract parameters represented by combinations of guarantee and
incentive share components in the Holmstrom-Milgrom framework. Addi-
tionally, we consider the equilibrium that occurs when the supply of potential
agents is larger than required to meet all contracts offered by principals and
when any excess supply of agents have opportunities to work as wage labor
in a shadow labor market that is large (and thus exogenous) compared with
the market for tenant farmers. The supply of rental land in a given geographic
locality is assumed to derive from a finite pool of landowners fixed by the
geographic specificity of land assets and an associated distribution of attributes
described by risk preferences and land-related variances of landowner-specific
shocks (included in jd). The demand for rental farmland is from a pool of
prospective tenants with a distribution of attributes described by ability, cost
of effort, risk preferences, and reservation utility.
In developing country agriculture, these conditions correspond with the
common phenomenon whereby peasant labor not required for local agriculture
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moves temporarily to cities. In developed agriculture, this excess supply of
tenants is caused by the increasing scale of efficient farm size and consequent
exodus of farmers from agriculture as farm size increases (Huffman and Ev-
enson 2001). To draw sharp results, we assume that the number of landowners
in a given geographic region, for example, a peasant village or small farming
community, is sufficiently small that each principal faces essentially the same
distribution of attributes in the excess labor pool regardless of behavior by
other principals.21 Clearly, equilibrium in these circumstances will result in
landowners contracting only with tenants who have high productivity (high
ability relative to cost of effort) and low risk premiums (low risk aversion
and agent risk), other things being equal.
Cash versus Share Rent
To see whether remaining stylized facts are predicted by the model, consider
how the optimal contract represented by equations (13)–(16) depends on cir-
cumstances. In developing agriculture, tenants are typically landless and poor
(Otsuka et al. 1992; Lanjouw 1999; Banerjee et al. 2002). While the model
of this article is developed with a local approximation of absolute risk aversion
where utility is an expansion around expected wealth for each individual in
each time period (see Just and Zilberman 1983), absolute risk aversion is
assumed to be decreasing in expected wealth. Thus, peasant tenants in de-
veloping agriculture would be more (probably far more) risk averse than
wealthy landowners (see Ackerberg and Botticini 2002). Furthermore, in de-
veloping countries, especially in Asia, plot sizes are very small, and thus
landowners rent to many tenants. When a landowner has sufficient size to
contract with many tenants, agent-specific production risk is spread among
agents, which reduces the landowner’s risk through diversification.
Greater risk aversion among tenants, less risk aversion by landowners,
and spreading of risk (which has the same effect as lowering agent-specific
risk on landowner choice)22 all tend to reduce the optimal share toward the
result in equation (15) and away from the cash rent case where . Thus,∗b p 1i
the circumstances of developing country agriculture tend to be those under
which crop-share contracts occur.
Turning to the case of developed countries, landowners tend to be retired
farmers, their widows, or absentee landowners (Rogers 1991; Duffy et al.
2003). Such individuals tend to be in a conservative stage of life where they
are more reluctant to be involved in farm management decisions or to bear
production and marketing risk (Duffy et al. 2003), whereas active farmers are
accustomed to bearing the substantial risks of large-scale agriculture. Fur-
thermore, under the assumption that more farmers are available than can be
supported on the land held by landowners with each successive round of
adjustment to changes in efficient farming scale, competition among agents
creates an incentive for each principal to select agents with less risk aversion,
other things being equal, and thereby reduce the efficiency loss associated
with agent risk bearing in the principal’s payoff. As a result, farmers with
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higher risk aversion are more likely to exit as efficient scale increases because
they are unable to rent sufficient land to maintain an efficient farm size. In
turn, exiting farmers tend to become landowners with what farmland they
own, which contributes to making the pool of landowners more risk averse.
As a result of this ongoing process, tenants in developed country agriculture
tend to be less risk averse, whereas the landowners tend to be more risk
averse.
In addition, landowners in developed agriculture tend to own contiguous
tracts of cropland and to rent to a single tenant because their land is often
obtained by retirement or inheritance from a farmer who no longer had a
sufficient farm size to compete. As a result, the risk from sharecrop tenancy
cannot be spread across tenants by landowners. In fact, tenants in developed
agriculture often rent from several landowners to achieve efficient farm size
because of the rapid increase in farm size over the past half century. For
example, the 1997 Census of Agriculture reports that the United States had
2,124,000 farms, with about 489,000 renting some of the land they farm from
2,290,000 landowners (Heimlich 2003; U.S. Department of Agriculture, NASS
2003). Thus, on average, each farm that acquired some land by rental was
renting land from about five landowners.
Low risk aversion among tenants, high risk aversion among landowners,
and an inability to spread risk by landowners all tend to increase the optimal
tenant share toward . Thus, the model explains the tendency toward∗b p 1i
cash rental contracts in developed country agriculture and an increase in that
tendency as the efficient farm size has increased.
Optimal Shares under Share Rent
While the results thus far explain why share contracts tend to occur in de-
veloping agriculture and cash contracts tend to occur in developed agriculture,
a wide variety of contract terms are possible in the model depending on the
risk aversion of landowners, the risk aversion of tenants, and the contributions
of tenants’ characteristics and landowner holdings to risk. It remains to show
why incentive contracts likely do not include a guarantee when sharing occurs
(i.e., why when ) and why sharing tends to be 50 : 50 when∗ ∗a p 0 b ! 1i i
sharing occurs (i.e., why if ). We present several arguments∗ ∗b p 0.5 b ! 1i i
that motivate these conclusions.
The Case of a Shadow Labor Market with a Risk-Neutral Landowner
First, consider a case consistent with the conditions of developed country
agriculture. To explain why tenancy contracts may not include a guarantee
when sharing occurs (i.e., why when ), it is useful to consider∗ ∗a p 0 b ! 1i i
further the agent’s reservation utility and its role in equilibrium analysis. In
reality, the agent’s reservation utility is likely determined by alternative em-
ployment opportunities available to prospective tenants. A model explaining
potential income from alternative employment can be constructed in many
different ways, but a relatively simple model suffices for our purposes. Sup-
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pose that if a prospective tenant does not rent land, the only alternative is to
work as wage labor in a shadow labor market where compensation is pro-
portional to effort (e.g., effort may represent hours of labor).
Specifically, suppose effort allocated to an alternative labor market by
the ith agent is denoted by , where the exogenous and certain wage adjustede˜i
for agent-specific ability is and, thus, income from wage labor is . If˜ ˜ ˜a a ei i i
the ith agent does not rent land, then the agent’s expected utility following
the model in equation (3) is for which expected2˜ ˜ ˜ ˜E[U(e )]p a e  0.5k e ,i i i i i
utility maximization implies with optimal expected utility∗˜ ˜e p a /ki i i
where is an agent-specific index of∗ 2 2˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜E[U(e )]p 0.5a /k p 0.5p , p p a /ki i i i i i i
worker productivity in the labor market. This would represent the reservation
utility mi in equation (9) for the case where equation (1) represents the joint
net revenue of the tenant and landowner from farming. With this alternative,
an agent will optimally allocate either all effort to farming and none to the
labor market if or all∗ ∗ 2˜ ˜(e p b a /k and e p 0) a  0.5b (p  r ) 1 0.5p ,i i i i i i i i i i
effort to the labor market and none to farming and if∗ ∗˜ ˜(e p 0 e p a /k )i i i i
23 Equation (10) thus becomes2 ˜a  0.5b (p  r ) ! 0.5p .i i i i i
2
˜a p 0.5p  0.5b (p  r ). (17)i i i i i
However, given the alternative labor market, the principal must optimize ex-
pected utility with the constraint because otherwise the tenant woulda ≤ 0i
shirk by allocating effort to the labor market for extra income. Thus, equation
(17) applies only if ai is nonpositive; otherwise, the optimal choice is
.
24 If and the landowner is risk neutral, then the principal’s∗ ∗a p 0 a p 0i i
expected utility in equation (8) reduces to fornE[U(P)]p  (1 b )b p ,i i iip1
which first-order conditions reduce to
pi
b p p 1/2, ip 1, ... , n. (18)i 2pi
Thus, all crop-share contracts follow 50 : 50 sharing regardless of agent-
specific productivity, risk preferences, risk aversion, or reservation utility and
regardless of the risk characteristics of the landowner’s land.
To see when is likely, note that equation (17) suggests a non-∗a p 0i
negative ai if wages in the shadow labor market are relatively high ( isp˜i
large). In particular, the ai suggested by equation (17) is at least zero if
. Whenever the ai suggested is nonnegative, the optimal choice2p˜ ≥ b (p  r )i i i i
for ai is . Note, however, that the agent will only accept such a contract∗a p 0i
if because otherwise the labor market is more attractive to2 ˜b (p  r ) ≥ pi i i i
the agent. Thus, if wages in the labor market are too high relative to the return
on effort in farming, then no agents are willing to farm. Considering equi-
librium adjustments whereby farming returns will increase as land is taken
out of production, returns to farming represented by pi must then adjust upward
to at least the point where, for all land remaining in farming, 2b (p  r ) ≥i i i
, and thus . Thus, the case with relatively high wages in the labor∗p˜ a p 0i i
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market and risk-neutral landowners tends to the case where the optimal crop-
share contract offered by a risk-neutral landowner is the 50 : 50 sharing ar-
rangement in equation (18).
The Risk-Neutral Landowner with Costs of Information
Another possibility is that the landowner may not know all prospective tenants’
agent-specific productivities, risks, risk aversions, and reservation utilities,
particularly when the number of (prospective) tenants associated with a given
landowner is large, as in developing country agriculture. To reduce information
demands and information collection and processing costs, one possibility is
for the landowner to consider a limited maximization of expected utility. For
example, suppose that the principal simply restricts the types of contracts
offered to the two common arrangements observed empirically: either a cash
rent or crop-share contract. Or alterna-∗ ∗ ∗ ∗(a 1 0,b p 0) (a p 0,b 1 0)i i i i
tively, suppose that the principal simply forgoes the opportunity to optimize
expected utility with respect to ai by omitting it from the model, as might be
the case where the cost of collecting information on all prospective tenants’
reservation utilities is excessive.
If the principal is risk neutral (the case where sharing is optimal gen-
erally), then the principal’s expected utility in equation (8) reduces to
both in the latter case and in the former casenE[U(P)]p  (1 b )b pi i iip1
when crop sharing is chosen. Thus, first-order conditions reduce to equation
(18). This result implies that the optimal crop-share contract for all agents is
the same 50 : 50 crop-share contract regardless of their agent-specific pro-
ductivity, risk preferences, risk aversion, or reservation utility. With this ap-
proach, the major problem of collecting and processing full information about
prospective tenants and administering contracts accordingly is completely
eliminated. Thus, if this information cost exceeds the benefits possible from
using full information for individual contract optimization, then the contract
in equation (18) is the optimal contract regardless of the assumption that
for this case.a p 0i
The Case of Unimportant Common Random Shocks with Information Costs
Another case that tends toward the same result occurs when the common
stochastic shock is unimportant and the landowner rents to numerous2(j p 0)d
tenants. For example, suppose that a landowner has given aggregate land
holdings, say one unit, and increases the number of tenants to whom the given
holdings are allocated equally in rental contracts. If, for example, all tenants
have the same characteristics (represented by dropping the i subscript) and
, then the landowner’s expected utility in equation (8) becomes25a p 0i
2 2E[U(P)]p n(1/n b/n)bp 0.5nF (1/n b/n) j .0
Thus, as the landowner’s land is divided among more tenants, the risk premium
tends to zero, and accordingly the optimal share tends to the same result as
in equation (18). This result corresponds with the case in developing countries
where tenants rent very small plots and each landowner has many plots. While
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this result is developed for the simple case with identical characteristics, the
same principle of spreading risk clearly applies when agents’ characteristics
vary within reasonable bounds. That is, the risk premium will vanish as given
land holdings are divided among more tenants, in which case optimal sharing
in rental contracts tends to equation (18) regardless of plot size. Again, in
this case, the major problem of collecting and processing full information
about prospective tenants and administering contracts accordingly is com-
pletely eliminated. Thus, 50 : 50 crop shares are optimal if this information
cost exceeds the benefits from its use for individual contract optimization,
regardless of the assumption that .a p 0i
Tenant Competition with Agent Immobility
Another possibility is to treat reservation utilities as endogenous in the case
where tenants do not have an alternative labor market, which may be the case
in some remote villages in developing countries. Then competition among
tenants for agricultural land can result in bidding down the guarantee com-
ponent of rental contracts. Because the landowner’s profit is strictly decreasing
in ai in equation (8), this effect of competition, which increases ai toward
zero, is favorable to the landowner. However, the landowner would not offer
contracts with because tenants could then shirk and yet collect thea 1 0i
guarantee, leaving the landowner with a negative profit. Thus, with sufficient
numbers of prospective tenants (sufficient competition), the effects of com-
petition are bounded at , in which case either a risk-neutral landowner∗a p 0i
or many tenants contracting with a single landowner tends toward a contract
with 50 : 50 landlord-tenant sharing as in the previous two cases.
Conclusions
Comprehensive explanations of common empirical results (stylized facts) have
eluded theoretical studies of land tenancy. In this article, we have applied
modern agency theory to explain land tenancy contracts in developing and
developed countries. We do not assume that effort can be monitored or that
contracts are enforceable by courts. Thus, we relax assumptions prevalent in
the agricultural contracting literature that are inconsistent with observed prac-
tices whereby most land tenancy contracts are informal and oral. We have
shown how heterogeneity of characteristics among principals (riskiness of
landowners’ land and landowner risk aversion) and agents (tenants’ produc-
tivities, risk premiums, and reservation utilities) can affect optimal tenancy
contracts.
While equations (12)–(14) suggest that the optimal tenant’s share should
generally vary across tenants and landowners because of these sources of
heterogeneity, the results of this article present a variety of explanations for
why the empirical evidence shows a predominance of either cash rent or crop-
share contracts, that is, no fixed component of compensation when crop shares
are selected. The results tend to explain why crop-share contracts dominate
in developing agriculture where landowners are believed to be less risk averse
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:59:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Wallace E. Huffman and Richard E. Just 635
than tenants and can spread risk over many tenants. They explain why cash
rental contracts tend to be observed in developed country agriculture where
landowners are likely more risk averse and tenants are less risk averse, but
yet crop-share contracts may be observed in cases where landowners tend to
be risk neutral. The results also explain why cash rental contracts are becoming
more common in North American agriculture, where credit and insurance
markets have improved, tenants have become wealthier, and landowners have
become older and likely more conservative.
The results also provide a variety of explanations for why 50 : 50 sharing
is widely observed under crop-share contracts in spite of tenant and landowner
heterogeneity. Thus, the principal-agent model of this article provides a po-
tential explanation for the half-century-old puzzle about why share tenancy
rates in a wide range of circumstances tend to be one-half (Otsuka et al. 1992,
p. 1969). One important explanation lies in the transactions cost of collecting,
processing, and administering contracts with agent-specific information. But
other explanations have to do with equilibrium effects of alternative labor
markets, or the lack thereof.
While the analysis of this article shows that a principal-agent model can
explain the major stylized facts about land tenancy that have often eluded
theoretical studies, a variety of generalizations are needed. First, the model
needs to be generalized to consider separate choices for both the sharing of
output and the sharing of cash input expenses. Both Allen and Lueck (2002)
and Duffy et al. (2003) find that share tenancy contracts for U.S. field crops
share current expenses as well as output. Many of these crops place heavy
demands on soil nutrients and, in the Great Plains and the West, on irrigation
water.
Second, landowners frequently care about more than the immediate in-
come they receive from their land. Land quality can be degraded by tenant
management decisions that cause excessive exhaustion of soil nutrients, soil
erosion, or depletion of soil moisture, all of which reduce future productivity
of land. Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe (2000) show that, other things equal, U.S.
farmers who lease for cash are less likely to adopt conservation tillage practices
than crop-share farmers (or owner-operators). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)
and Dixit (2002) have introduced models for structuring optimal contracts
with multitasking that can represent additional interests of the landowner.
Adding these features to the model of this article will likely show that an
agent will degrade long-term productivity for short-term gains if the incentive
rate is too high. Thus, given the trade-off between short- and long-term ob-
jectives, the best interest of the landowner is more likely served by a modest
rather than strong incentive for current effort. In other words, the principal
will be less likely to choose a cash rental payment than a sharing contract
for two reasons. First, the short-term incentive to overuse the land is reduced.
Second, if the landowner participates in production decisions by sharing cur-
rent fertilizer and irrigation expenses, then current production can be better
balanced with future productivity.
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Third, multitasking is also related to issues raised by Gibbons (1998)
about designing share contracts with a simple quantifiable payoff. Because
contracts are frequently for two or more types of actions that differ in the
degree to which their output can be measured, making incentives too strong
on an easy-to-measure action and de-emphasizing or ignoring other actions
will lead to poor contracts and outcomes for the principal. When contracts
are renewable and multitasking is important, Gibbons (1998) and MacLeod
(2003) have shown that subjective evaluations are frequently better than ob-
jective ones, and weak incentives frequently produce better results than strong
but imperfectly specified incentives. These insights on informal contracting
can be used to sharpen understanding of the advantages of crop-share contracts
and the informal nature of land tenancy contracts.
Fourth, the results of this article assume that the principal does not have
hidden actions that affect the agent’s payoffs and that the tenant has sufficient
wealth to make cash rental payments even in bad crop years. If, for example,
the principal is leasing land of unknown quality to a tenant and the tenant
cannot observe land quality before leasing it, then an optimal contract may
tend more toward risk sharing, even though this tendency is mitigated by
contract renewability.
Fifth, with cash rent, output risk may not be transferred completely from
the principal to the agent as modeled here unless the payment is made at the
beginning of the season. In Iowa, for example, relatively few contracts require
full payment of cash rent at the beginning of the contract year (Duffy et al.
2003). Frequently, contracts require part of the cash rent payment before
midyear, and sometimes the size of the second payment is renegotiated (Allen
and Lueck 2002). When cash payments are due during or at the end of the
crop year, output risk is incompletely shifted to the tenant because default
and renegotiation are possible. Under these conditions, the asset holdings and
reputation of the tenant become more important to the landowner than oth-
erwise. In developed countries, prospective tenants are more likely to have
sufficient wealth and access to credit and insurance so that contract perfor-
mance is more likely (Newberry and Stiglitz 1979; Braverman and Stiglitz
1982; Laffont and Matoussi 1995). But this may be another explanation for
why cash contracts tend to be observed in developed rather than developing
agriculture.
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24–25, 2003. The project has benefited from resources of the Iowa Agriculture and
Home Economics Experiment Stations and from the University of Maryland Agri-
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1. Laffont and Matoussi (1995) also report for the El Oulja region of Tunisia in
1986 that land contracts were 57% cash rental and 43% crop shares and that 71% of
share leases involved 50 : 50 shares.
2. From 1988 to 2000, 46% of U.S. farmland was leased, of which about 88%
was from nonfarmers (Anderson 1994; Heimlich 2003).
3. In southeast Iowa, where a much smaller share of total land is cropped, a much
larger share of the land is operated by the owner—56% versus 29% for North Central
Iowa. However, for leased land, roughly two-thirds is for cash and one-third is for
crop-share rent. This raises the issue, which we do not address here, that crop-share
contracts are not applicable to land that is not cropped (Duffy et al. 2003).
4. Some deviations from sharing of output alone are observed whereby cash
expenses are also shared. For example, since no-till farming was adopted in developed
agriculture in the 1990s, with its minimal use of tenants’ labor for field preparations
and cultivation, the tenant often bears more than 50% of the herbicide cost (e.g., 70%).
5. Of course, a dynamic model along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987)
or Thomas and Worrall (1990) is needed to model fully the economics of renewability
and the related issues of reputation. But the technical detail of a careful dynamic
analysis would detract from the purpose of this article without adding appreciably to
understanding.
6. Another model might consider a principal’s use of a tournament to screen
agents with whom to contract, but tournaments have well-known disadvantages. An
agent can invest effort directly to increase his own rank or to sabotage competitors.
Thus, unless agents can be restricted in their activities or carefully monitored, tour-
naments have important disadvantages as a screening mechanism (Gibbons 1998).
7. When incentives are nonlinear, marginal incentives can become distorted in
multiperiod models. For example, when incentives follow a step function, agents can
game the incentive scheme by producing either nothing or at the step in alternate
periods. Similar but less extreme results also occur with smooth nonlinearity.
8. Although developed in the context of labor contracting, Eswaran and Kotwal
(1985) show that two-tier contracting may be appropriate for repetitive versus transitory
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agents when loyalty is valued by the principal. While their model does not focus on
human capital creation, application of Becker’s (1975) notions in their framework
suggests that landowners will prefer repeated contracting with agents who learn better
how to farm their particular tract of land as experience is accumulated.
9. Studies by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Serfes (2003) also assume
heterogeneity of principals and agents with respect to risk-sharing attitudes but, in
contrast to this article, do so primarily with a focus on implications for endogenous
matching.
10. If, e.g., tenants’ ability matters, then Allen and Lueck’s (1999) regression
results would suffer from omitted variable bias. This omission, combined with a
representation of tenants’ risk preferences that is proxied by tenant wealth and age,
could invalidate their finding that risk preferences have no significant effect on land
tenure contracts.
11. Under the Household Responsibility System in China, which has been in
place for almost 2 decades, farmland is largely owned by the local community and
allocated by a community council. Some of this land is distributed to farmers according
to need, while the rest is rented by farmers from the community council (see Chen,
Huffman, and Rozelle 2003).
12. While Allen and Lueck (1999) develop some empirical evidence to justify
the assumption of risk neutrality, the evidence is based on showing a lack of dependence
of tenancy contract terms on wealth. However, risk aversion does not depend on wealth
under constant absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, the dependence on wealth under
decreasing absolute risk aversion may be too weak to discern empirically even though
risk aversion is important.
13. Deininger and Feder (2001) also provide a transactions cost perspective for
land asset and rental markets.
14. See Dixit (2002) and MacLeod (2003) for analyses of implicit contracts that
require subjective evaluations and are thus necessarily informal.
15. In other words, d may include a landowner-specific shock as well as a general
random shock common across all principals. While we do not pursue the matter here,
Hueth and Ligon (2001) have shown that demand-induced market prices can generate,
in effect, a type of relative performance evaluation that rewards high production in
periods where others’ production is low because of supply shocks.
16. The constant 0.5 is arbitrary but simplifies algebra and allows the model to
be defined in terms of absolute risk aversion.
17. Assuming that the contract is not accepted unless the certainty equivalent
expected utility is infinitesimally larger than the reservation utility does not appreciably
alter the results.
18. One reason that tenants in developed agriculture may make risk-neutral land
tenancy decisions is the abundance of commodity futures markets for the crops grown
there. For example, under certain assumptions, the separation result shows that farmers
in the presence of futures markets optimally behave with risk neutrality in commodity
production decisions, even though they behave with risk aversion in futures market
transactions (Danthine 1978; Holthausen 1979; Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980). While
this result has been developed for the case of price risk, the shocks in eq. (1) represent
either output or revenue. A similar argument is also made by Allen and Lueck (2002)
with respect to capital and insurance markets.
19. In the agency literature, this type of contract corresponds with principals
selling franchises to risk-neutral agents (Prendergast 2002).
20. There remains an end-game problem, i.e., as contracting parties near the end
of their relationship, each has less incentive to avoid reneging because future reputation
is less important (Holmstrom 1979; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 260). In these
situations, formal contracting becomes more important.
21. While a more formal competitive equilibrium with finite numbers of pro-
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:59:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Wallace E. Huffman and Richard E. Just 641
spective tenants by attribute combination could be developed using concepts such as
marginal tenant characteristics, the forthcoming intuition does not extend appreciably
beyond the restrictive case considered here.
22. While the model in this article has been developed with identical one-unit
tract sizes for all tenants, this result is evident, e.g., by comparing the principal’s risk
premium between the cases of n tenants with one unit of land each versus one tenant
with n units of land. In the case of n identical tenants with independent agent-specific
production shocks, eq. (8) becomes
n 2
2 2 2E[U(P)]p n[(1 b )b p a ] 0.5F j n b  n(1 b ) j .[ (  ) ]i i i i 0 d j i ijp1
The only difference in this expected utility for the case with one farmer who rents n
units of land is to square the n in the last term in brackets because eq. (1) becomes
Because the agent-specific production shock as welly (e )p na e  n  nd, ip 1.i i i i i
as the common shock d are both multiplied by n in this case, the principal’s risk
premium has an agent-specific component that is n times larger than with n agents
who each rent one unit of land.
23. More generally, if an alternative labor market is available, its implications
can be included in the agent’s utility maximization problem so that the agent’s expected
utility in eq. (3) becomes
2 2 2
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜E[U (e , e )]p a  b a e  a e  0.5k (e  e )  0.5F b q .i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
Optimization for a given tenancy choice (to rent or not rent) with respect to ei and e˜i
obtains the result that the agent allocates either all effort to farming and none to the
labor market if or allocates all effort to the labor∗ ∗˜ ˜(e p b a /k and e p 0) b a 1 ai i i i i i i i
market and none to farming if However, a rational∗ ∗˜ ˜ ˜(e p 0 and e p a /k ) b a ! a .i i i i i i i
landowner will not offer a contract with and because the tenant will collect˜a 1 0 b a ! ai i i i
the positive guarantee payment and then shirk by working off the farm, leaving the
landowner with a negative expected profit. Neither will a rational prospective tenant
accept a contract with and because working in the labor market is more˜a ! 0 b a ! ai i i i
attractive, in which case paying a cash guarantee to the landowner obtains no benefits.
Finally, a rational landowner will not offer a contract with and because˜a 1 0 b a 1 ai i i i
the tenant has enough incentive to fulfill the rental contract without paying the tenant
an additional guarantee component. Thus, any mutually acceptable contract must satisfy
and (indifference occurs if , in which case the landowner cannot˜ ˜a X 0 b a 1 a b a p ai i i i i i i
be assured that shirking will not occur). To endogenize the choice of whether to rent,
note that if the tenant will (not) accept the rental contract only ifa ! 0 a i i
2 2˜
˜0.5b (p  r ) 1 (!) 0.5b p .i i i i i
24. If , then the agent would prefer a rental contract even if the agent isa 1 0i
better off working in the labor market. That is, the agent could enter the contract,
receive the cash payment from the principal, and then shirk by allocating all effort to
the labor market and earning a full labor-market wage if that return to effort exceeds
the return for effort in farming. Thus, the principal would be vulnerable to receiving
no farm output and making a loss equal to the cash payment. The principal could be
assured of avoiding this outcome only under full information by offering a hgher
incentive for farming than the agent can earn in the alternative labor market,
. But if this condition is satisfied, then offering a positive fixed payment,2 ˜b (p  r )p pi i i i
, is unnecessary and wasteful for the principal. Thus, the participation constrainta 1 0i
switches from equation (17) to , when ai becomes nonnegative, and2 ˜b (p  r )p pi i i i
the principal will never offer an .a 1 0i
25. In this case, rather than each tenant receiving one unit of land, the landowner
has one unit of land and divides it equally among n tenants so that each receives 1/n
units of land. Thus, eq. (1) becomes Accordingly,y (e )p (a e    d)/n, ip 1, ... , n.i i i i i
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:59:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
642 Economic Development and Cultural Change
the agent-specific variance is multiplied by compared with the case with one tenant,21/n
which after aggregating across n tenants leaves the risk premium divided by n compared
with the single tenant case. Another way to see this result is by comparison of eqq. (12)
and (13) because ji 2 and jd 2 receive equal weighting in eq. (12) where , whereasnp 1
the weighting of ji 2 is less than that of jd 2 by a factor of n in eq. (13).
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